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Abstract
In this paper we prove that all the existing conditional event al-
gebras (abbreviated cea in this paper) embed into the three-valued
extension (TL|TL) of temporal logic of discrete past time, which the
authors of this paper have proposed in [TRH01] as a general model of
conditional events.
First of all, we discuss the descriptive incompleteness of the cea’s.
In this direction, we show that some important notions, like indepen-
dence of conditional events, cannot be properly addressed in the cea
framework, while they can be precisely formulated and analyzed in the
(TL|TL) setting.
We also demonstrate that the embeddings allow one to use the na-
tive (TL|TL) algorithms for computing probabilities of complex con-
ditional expressions of the embedded cea’s, and that these algorithms
can outperform those previously known.
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1.1 The problem of conditional objects
Probabilistic reasoning [Pea88] is the basis of Bayesian methods of expert
system inferences, of knowledge discovery in databases, and in several other
domains of computer, information, and decision sciences. The model of
conditioning and conditional objects we discuss serves equally to reason
about probabilities over a finite domain X, or probabilistic propositional
logic with a finite set of atomic formulae.
Computing of conditional probabilities of the form Pr(X|Y1, . . . , Yn) and, by
extension of conditional beliefs, is well understood. Attempts of defining first
the conditional objects of the basic form X|Y , and then defining Pr(X|Y ) as
Pr((X|Y )) were proposed, without much success, by some of the founders
of probability [Boo57, dF72]. They were taken up systematically only about
1980 [Ada86, Lew76, ES94, GGNR91, GN95]. The development was slow,
both because of logical difficulties — interpretation of conditionals, and even
more because the computational model is difficult to construct. (While a|b
appears to stand for a sentence ‘if b then a’ and the probability is Pr(a|b) =
Pr(a∧ b)/Pr(b), there is no obvious calculation for Pr(a|(b|c)), nor intuitive
meaning for a|(b|c), (a|b) ∧ (c|d), and the like.)
The idea of defining conditional objects was entertained by some founders of
modern probability [Boo57, dF72], but generally abandoned since introduc-
tion of the measure-theoretic model. It was revived mostly by philosophers
in 1970’s [Ada86, vF77] with a view towards artificial intelligence reasoning.
Formal computational models came in the late 1980’s [Cal87, GNW91] with
only one, based on formal fractions and three-valued indicator functions,
used for few actual calculations of conditionals and their probabilities. That
model may give results whose values are open to questions [Cal94].
The authors of this paper have developed in the companion paper [TRH01]
a temporal calculus (TL|TL) of conditionals, based on the early ideas of de
Finetti [dF72].
In the present paper we show that all the major previously existing systems
of conditionals, the so called conditional event algebras (see [GMN97] or Sect.
4.2 in the current paper), embed isomorphically into (TL|TL). Looking at
them as fragments of (TL|TL), we demonstrate their insufficient expressive
power and other defects in their construction.
They attempt to provide certain kind of a model of the logic of conditional
expressions, built up from simple conditionals of the form (a|b) with the
connectives: conjunction, disjunction and complementation.
However, the semantical objects assigned to the expressions are not required
to be of probabilistic nature, so they fail to provide methods to verify the
chosen structure experimentally.
The structure of conditionals is not determined functorially by the space of
2nonconditional events.
Moreover, very restricted setting of cea’s does not allow one to address many
important questions, like stochastic independence of complex conditionals.
In the (TL|TL) setting independence can be precisely defined and analyzed,
unlike in the cea formalism, (cf. Theorem 29 below).
Finally, we use the algorithms for calculating probabilities in (TL|TL), which
stem from the highly developed algorithms for calculating limiting probabil-
ities in Markov chains, and apply them to the embedded cea’s. It appears
that these algorithms clearly outperform the previously known ones for the
important product space cea [Goo94].
Consequently, we believe that our (TL|TL) can be used as a single alterna-
tive to each of the major cea’s considered in the literature so far, superior to
each of them, in the sense of expressive power, clarity of logical and seman-
tical structure, and, last but not least, availability of efficient algorithms.
2 The tools
2.1 (TL|TL), Moore machines and Markov chains
We describe briefly the construction of temporal conditionals, presented in
detail in [TRH01].
Let E = {a, b, c, d, . . . } be a finite set of basic events, and let Σ be the
Boolean algebra generated by E, and Ω the set of atoms of Σ. Consequently,
Σ is isomorphic to the powerset of Ω, and Ω is isomorphic to the powerset
of E. Any element of Σ will be considered as an event, and, in particular,
E ⊆ Σ.
The union, intersection and complementation in Σ are denoted by a∪b, a∩b
and a∁, respectively. The least and greatest elements of Σ are denoted ∅
and Ω, respectively. However, sometimes we use a more compact notation,
replacing ∩ by a juxtaposition. When we turn to logic, it is customary to
use yet another notation: a∨ b, a∧ b and ¬a, respectively. In this situation
Ω appears as true and ∅ as false, but 1 and 0, respectively, are incidentally
used, as well.
3 = {0, 1,⊥} is the set of truth values, interpreted as true, false and un-
defined, respectively. The subset of 3 consisting of 0 and 1 will be denoted
2.
Let us first define temporal logic of linear discrete past time, called TL.
The formulas are built up from the set E (the same set of basic events as
before), interpreted as propositional variables here, and are closed under the
following formula formation rules:
1. Every a ∈ E is a formula of temporal logic.
32. If ϕ,ψ ∈ TL, then their boolean combinations ϕ ∨ ψ ¬ϕ are in TL.
The other Boolean connectives: ∧,→,↔, . . . can be defined in terms
of ¬ and ∨, as usual.
3. If ϕ,ψ ∈ TL, then their past tense temporal combinations ✉ϕ and
ϕSinceψ are in TL, where ✉ϕ is spelled “previously ϕ.”
A model of temporal logic is a sequence M = s0, s1, . . . , sn of states, each
state being a function from E (the same set of basic events as before) to the
boolean values {0, 1}. Note that a state can be therefore understood as an
atomic event from Ω, and M can be thought of as a word from Ω+. The
states of M are ordered by ≤, and s+1 denotes the successor state of s. We
adopt the convention that, unless explicitly indicated otherwise, a model is
always of length n+ 1, and thus n is always the last state of a model.
For every state s of M we define inductively what it means that a formula
ϕ ∈ TL is satisfied in the state s of M, symbolically M, s |= ϕ.
1. M, s |= a iff s(a) = 1
2.
M, s |= ¬ϕ :⇐⇒ M, s 6|= ϕ,
M, s |= ϕ ∨ ψ :⇐⇒ M, s |= ϕ or M, s |= ψ.
3.
M, s |= ✉ϕ :⇐⇒ s > 0 and M, s − 1 |= ϕ;
M, s |= ϕSinceψ :⇐⇒ (∃t ≤ s)(M, t |= ψ and (∀t < w ≤ s)M,w |= ϕ).
The syntactic abbreviations ϕ and ϕ are of common use in TL. They
are defined by ϕ ≡ true Sinceϕ and ϕ ≡ ¬¬ϕ. The first of them is
spelled “once ϕ” and the latter “always in the past ϕ”.
Their semantics is then equivalent to
M, s |= ϕ ⇐⇒ (∀t ≤ s)M, t |= ϕ;
M, s |= ϕ ⇐⇒ (∃t ≤ s)M, t |= ϕ.
Theorem 1 (see [Eme90]). The set of valid TL formulas is complete in
PSPACE. The set of valid TL formulas with  and  as the only temporal
connectives is complete in coNP.
(TL|TL) is the logic of formulas of the form (ϕ|ψ), where ϕ,ψ ∈ TL. (TL|TL)
is a 3-valued extension of TL, and (ϕ|ψ) is
1). true in M, n iff M, n |= ϕ ∧ ψ.
40). false in M, n iff M, n |= ¬ϕ ∧ ψ.
⊥). undefined in M, n iff M, n |= ¬ψ.
A 3-valued Moore machine A is a five-tuple A = (Q,Ω, δ, h, q0), where where
Q is its set of states, Ω (the same set of atomic events as before) is the input
alphabet, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state and δ : Q × Ω → Q is the transition
function, and h is the output function Q→ 3.
Formally, to describe the computation of A we extend δ to a function δˆ :
Q× Ω+ → Q in the following way:
δˆ(q, w) =
{
δ(q, w) if |w| = 1
δ(δˆ(q, v), ω) if w = vω.
A computes a function fA : Ω
+ → 3+ defined by
fA(ω1ω2 . . . ωn) = h(δˆ(q0, ω1))h(δˆ(q0, ω1ω2)) . . . h(δˆ(q0, ω1ω2 . . . ωn))
(note that |fA(ω1ω2 . . . ωn)| = n, as desired)
We picture A as a labeled directed graph, whose vertices are elements of Q,
labeled by their values under h, the function δ is represented by directed
edges labeled by elements of Ω: the edge labeled by ω ∈ Ω from q ∈ Q leads
to δ(q, ω). The initial state is typically indicated by an unlabeled edge “from
nowhere” to this state.
As the letters of the input word w ∈ Ω+ come in one after another, we walk
in the graph, always choosing the edge labeled by the letter we receive. At
each step it reports to the outside world the value h(q) of the state q in
which it is at the moment.
Drawing Moore machines, we almost always make certain graphical simpli-
fication: we merge all the transitions joining the same pair of states into
a single transition, labeled by the union (evaluated in Σ) of all the labels.
Sometimes we go even farther and drop the label altogether from one transi-
tion, which means that all the remaining input letters follow this transition.
It is known for deterministic finite automata [HU79], and extends easily
to Moore machines with the same proof, that for any such device there
is a unique (up to isomorphism) minimal (with respect to the number of
states) device of the same kind, which accepts the same language (computes
the same function, respectively). Moreover, this minimal device can be
obtained from any such device as a quotient automaton/machine, i.e., by
dividing the state space by some equivalence relation. For details, including
a very efficient algorithm to perform minimization, see [HU79].
5Definition 2. A Moore machine A is called counter-free if there is no
word w ∈ Ω+ and no states q1, q2, . . . , qs, s > 1, such that δˆ(q1, w) =
q2, . . . , δˆ(qs−1, w) = qs, δˆ(qs, w) = q1.
Sometimes we use an extension of Moore machines—Moore machines with ǫ-
moves. In a deterministic finite automaton an ǫ-move is a transition between
two states done without intervention of any letter from the input. By neces-
sity, to maintain the deterministic character of the automaton, an ǫ-move
must not be combined with any other transitions starting from the same
state. For Moore machines, we adopt the convention that after performing
an ǫ-move, no symbol is appended to the output.
E.g., for the Moore machine with ǫ-moves A below
// ONMLHIJK⊥
̺
OO
ω //ONMLHIJK0 ǫ //ONMLHIJK1 ̺qq
ω
}}
we have fA(ωωω) = 0⊥0 and fA(ω̺ω) = 01⊥.
It is known that any function computable by a Moore machine with ǫ-moves
can be computed by a Moore machine without ǫ-moves. Thus using ǫ-moves
we do not achieve greater generality. However, some transformations of the
machines can be very conveniently represented by introducing ǫ-moves.
For us, Markov chains are a synonym of Markov chains with stationary
transitions and finite state space.
Formally, given a finite set I of states and a fixed function p : I × I → [0, 1]
satisfying (∀i ∈ I)
∑
j∈I p(i, j) = 1, the Markov chain with state space
I and transitions p is a sequence X = X0,X1, . . . of random variables Xn :
W → I, such that
Pr(Xn+1 = j|Xn = i) = p(i, j). (1)
The standard result of probability theory is that there exists a probability
triple (W,M,Pr) and a sequence X such that (1) is satisfied. W is indeed
the space of infinite sequences of ordered pairs of elements from I, and Pr
is a certain product measure on this set.
One can arrange the values p(i, j) in a matrix Π = (p(i, j); i, j ∈ I). Of
course, p(i, j) ≥ 0 and
∑
j∈I p(i, j) = 1 for every i. Every real square matrix
Π satisfying these conditions is called stochastic.
The initial distribution of X is that of X0, which can be conveniently rep-
resented by a vector Ξ0 = (p(i); i ∈ I). Its choice is independent from the
function p(i, j).
6It follows by a simple calculation that
Pr(Xn+1 = j|Xn = in,Xn−1 = in−1, . . . ,X1 = i1) = Pr(Xn+1 = j|Xn = i),
(2)
which is called the Markov property.
For our purposes, it is convenient to imagine the Markov chain X in another,
equivalent form: Let KI be the complete directed graph on the vertex set I.
First we randomly choose the starting vertex in I, according to the initial
distribution. Next, we start walking in KI ; at each step, if we are in the
vertex i, we choose the edge (i, j) to follow with probability p(i, j). If we
define Xn = (the vertex in which we are after n steps), then Xn is indeed
the same Xn as in (1).
So we will be able to draw Markov chains. Doing so, we will often omit
edges (i, j) with p(i, j) = 0.
2.2 Conditional objects and conditional events
Let for (ϕ|ψ) ∈ (TL|TL) the function c = c(ϕ|ψ) : Ω
+ → 3 be defined by
c(w) =


1 if (ϕ|ψ) is true in (w,n)
0 if (ϕ|ψ) is false in (w,n)
⊥ if (ϕ|ψ) is undefined in (w,n)
C is the set of all functions c : Ω+ → 3 definable in (TL|TL), and C+ is
the set of all functions c+ : Ω
+ → 3+ computable by counter-free 3-valued
Moore machines.
C and C+ are isomorphic under the mapping C+ ∋ c+ 7→ c ∈ C defined by
c(w) = last-letter-of(c+(w)).
The sets C and C+ are regarded as two representations of conditional objects.
We have yet another representation, denoted C∞: it consists of functions
Ω∞ → 3∞, and c∞, the third representation of the same conditional, is an
infinite sequence of values of c on all finite nonempty prefixes of w.
We will be using the name conditional events to refer to conditionals con-
sidered with a probability space in the background.
Definition 3 (Conditional event [TRH01]). Let c ∈ C be a conditional
object over Ω and let A be any counter-free Moore machine with output
function h, computing c+. Suppose Ω is endowed with a probability space
7structure (Ω,M,Pr). The conditional object c becomes then a sequence [[c]] =
[[c]]1, [[c]]2, . . . of random variables [[c]]n : Ω
∞ → 3, defined by the formula
[[c]]n(w) = c(prefix-of-length-n-of(w)), (3)
where Ω∞ is considered with the product probability structure.
We call [[c]] the conditional event associated with c.
Moreover, in presence of probability space structure A becomes a Markov
chain X(A) (by replacing labels of th e transitions by their probabilities
under Pr in the diagram of A), and then [[c]] = h(X), where h is the output
function of A.
In particular, Pr([[c]]n = 1) is the probability that at time n the conditional
object c is true, Pr([[c]]n = 0) is the probability that at time n the conditional
object c is false, and Pr([[c]] = ⊥) is the probability that at time n the
conditional object c is undefined.
Definition 4 (asymptotic probability [TRH01]). We define the asymp-
totic probability at time n of a conditional event c ∈ C by the formula
Prn(c) =
Pr([[c]]n = 1)
Pr([[c]]n = 0 or 1)
. (4)
If the denominator is 0, Prn(c) is undefined.
The asymptotic probability of c is
Pr(c) = lim
n→∞
Prn(c), (5)
provided that Prn(c) is defined for all sufficiently large n and the limit exists.
If ϕ ∈ TL then we write Pr(ϕ) for Pr((ϕ|true)).
Theorem 5 (Bayes’ Formula [TRH01]). Let (ϕ|ψ) be a conditional ob-
ject over Ω endowed with a probability space structure (Ω,M,Pr), and let A
be any counter-free Moore machine with output function h, computing (ϕ|ψ).
1. For every state i of X(A) the probability limn→∞ Pr(Xn = i) exists.
2. For every ⋆ ∈ 3 the probability limn→∞Pr([[(ϕ|ψ)]]n = ⋆) exists.
3. The Bayes’ Formula
Pr((ϕ|ψ)) =
Pr(ϕ ∧ ψ)
Pr(ψ)
holds whenever the right-hand-side above is well-defined, i.e., Pr(ψ) > 0.
83 Connectives of conditionals
If we wish to extend the classical two-valued conjunction to conditionals,
we are faced with the problem of synchronization. Indeed, what is easy
in 2-valued world becomes messy in 3-valued world. The problem is that
the conditionals need not become defined synchronously. For the classical
conjunction this problem does not exist, because both arguments are always
defined. Now we have to resolve the question how to define the conjunction,
when some of the arguments are undefined.
3.1 Present tense connectives
Let us recall that present tense connectives are those, whose definition in
(TL|TL) does not use temporal connectives, and therefore depends on the
present, only. Equivalently, an n-ary present tense connective is completely
characterized by a function 3n → 3.
Here are several possible choices for the conjunction, which is always defined
as a pointwise application of the following 3 valued functions. Above we
display the notation for the corresponding kind of conjunction.
x ∧SAC y
xy 0 1 ⊥
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1
⊥ 0 1 ⊥
x ∧GNW y
xy 0 1 ⊥
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 ⊥
⊥ 0 ⊥ ⊥
x ∧Sch y
xy 0 1 ⊥
0 0 0 ⊥
1 0 1 ⊥
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
¬x
x ¬x
0 1
1 0
⊥ ⊥
x ∨SAC y
xy 0 1 ⊥
0 0 1 0
1 1 1 1
⊥ 0 1 ⊥
x ∨GNW y
xy 0 1 ⊥
0 0 1 ⊥
1 1 1 1
⊥ ⊥ 1 ⊥
x ∨Sch y
xy 0 1 ⊥
0 0 1 ⊥
1 1 1 ⊥
⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
.
They can be equivalently described by syntactical manipulations in (TL|TL).
The reduction rules are as follows:
9(a|b) ∧SAC (c|d) = (abcd ∨ abd
∁ ∨ cdb∁|b ∨ d)
(a|b) ∧GNW (c|d) = (abcd|a
∁d ∨ c∁d ∨ abcd)
(a|b) ∧Sch (c|d) = (abcd|bd)
∼0(a|b) = (a
∁|b)
(a|b) ∨SAC (c|d) = (ab ∨ cd|b ∨ d)
(a|b) ∨GNW (c|d) = (ab ∨ cd|ab ∨ cd ∨ bd)
(a|b) ∨Sch (c|d) = (ab ∨ cd|bd).
(6)
The first is based on the principle “if any of the arguments becomes defined,
act!”. A good example would be a quotation from [Cal97]:
“One of the most dramatic examples of the unrecognized use
of compound conditioning was the first military strategy of our
nation. As the Colonialists waited for the British to attack,
the signal was ‘One if by land and two if by sea’. This is the
conjunction of two conditionals with uncertainty!”1
Of course, if the above was understood as a conjunction of two conditionals,
the situation was crying for the use of ∧SAC, whose definition has been
proposed independently by Schay, Adams and Calabrese (the author of the
quotation).
The conjunction ∧GNW represents a moderate approach, which in case of an
apparent evidence for 0 reports 0, but otherwise it prefers to report unknown
in a case of any doubt. Note that this conjunction is essentially the same as
lazy evaluation, known from programming languages.
Finally, the conjunction ∧Sch is least defined, and acts (classically) only if
both arguments become defined. It corresponds to the strict evaluation.
We have given an example for the use of ∧SAC. The uses of ∧GNW and ∧Sch
can be found in any computer program executed in parallel, which uses
either lazy or strict evaluation of its logical conditions. And indeed both of
them happily coexist in many programming languages, in that one of them
is the standard choice, the programmer can however explicitly override the
default and choose the other evaluation strategy.
This seems to suggest that neither of the three choices discussed in this
paragraph is the conjunction of conditionals. There are indeed many possible
choices, and all of them have their own merits. And indeed already the
original system of Schay consisted of five operations: ∼ 0,∧SAC,∨SAC,∧Sch
and ∨Sch. Moreover, he was aware that these operations still do not make
the algebra functionally complete (even in the narrowed sense, restricted to
1NB, if the British had decided to attack from both directions, but not simultaneously,
we would have probably discovered temporal conditionals much earlier.
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defining only operations which are undefined for all undefined arguments).
And in order to remedy this he suggested to use one of several additional
operators, one of them being ∧GNW! So for him all those operations could
coexist in one system.
Present tense re-conditioning Calabrese [Cal90] and Goodman, Nguyen
and Walker [GN95] proposed their own extensions of the conditioning oper-
ator to 3, hence making it available for re-conditioning in SAC and GNW,
respectively. The definitions are
x|SACy
xy 0 1 ⊥
0 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
1 0 1 ⊥
⊥ 0 1 ⊥
x|GNWy
xy 0 1 ⊥
0 ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
1 0 1 ⊥
⊥ 0 ⊥ ⊥
3.2 Past tense connectives
Now we consider connectives, whose definitions refer to the strict past of
their arguments. We continue to consider conjunction, which we use as a
kind of model example.
Examples of past tense connectives The following are connectives very
close to the conjunction and disjunction of the product space cea introduced
in [Goo94]2, defined by the rule: the conjunction is defined and true iff
both of its arguments have been defined, and moreover the historically first
values of its two arguments have been both 1. Otherwise it is defined and
false. Disjunction is defined similarly. They use the “Russian roulette”
approach to repeating experiments.
In the language of (TL|TL) (a|b) ∧PS (c|d) can be expressed by

 (a ∧ b ∧ (¬ ✉ b))∧
(c ∧ d ∧ (¬ ✉ d))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ true

 , (7)
and the definition of and (a|b) ∨PS (c|d) is similar. They seem complicated,
but can be simplified, what we do below, and the Moore machine represen-
tations are again much simpler and easier to analyze.
To simplify the (TL|TL) representation above, let us define first(a|b) to be
first(a|b) := ((a ∧ b ∧ ¬ ✉ b))|true). (8)
2See the discussion on embedding cea’s in our model below.
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It is convenient to denote by first2(a|b) the first argument of first(a|b).
Then the conjunction can be easily and effectively described as (first2(a|b)∧
first2(c|d)|true) (where ∧ is the classical conjunction of temporal logic).
The minimal Moore machine of first(a|b) is depicted in Fig. 2 below.
4 Embedding of existing cea ’s and their incom-
pleteness
In this section we want to discuss the problem of embedding existing cea’s
into our model, and on that basis, the problem of defining natural connec-
tives among conditionals in general.
4.1 Syntax
We assume the following syntax of the flat conditional expressions. The set
of all such expressions will be denoted L .
The set of these expressions is the smallest set, containing all simple condi-
tionals of the form (x|y), where x, y ∈ Ω, and closed under two-ary (infix)
operations ∧,∨ and one unary prefix operation ∼ .
If we require the closure under one additional binary operation (·|·) (which
shouldn’t be mixed up with the parenthesis-bar-parenthesis construction
appearing in simple conditionals), we obtain the set of full conditional ex-
pressions, denoted L| .
4.2 Conditional event algebras
According to [GMN97], a conditional event algebra (cea in short) over a
probability space (Ω,M,Pr) is a space (but not necessarily a probability
space) (Ωo,Mo,Pro), extending (Ω,M,Pr), together with a function (·|·) :
M×M→Mo such that
• Mo is an algebra of the signature of boolean algebras.
• (a|b) = (a ∩ b|b) for all a, b ∈M.
• The subalgebra of (Ωo,Mo,Pro) consisting of the elements (a|Ω) is
isomorphic to (Ω,M,Pr) under the bijection a 7→ (a|Ω).
• Pro((a|b)) = Pr(a ∩ b)/Pr(b) for a, b ∈M, Pr(b) > 0.
• Certain equalities hold among the Pro-probabilities.
• The Pro-probabilities for ∩,∪ and
∁ of elements of the form (ai|bi) for
ai, bi ∈ M are effectively computable from the set of Pr-probabilities
of all the boolean combinations of the elements ai, bi.
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How we understand cea ’s. It is readily seen, that any particular cea
over any (Ω,M,Pr) can be equivalently considered as a mapping assigning
elements of Mo and probabilities to flat conditional expressions. In this
sense, cea is a kind of amodel of a logic, whose syntax are the flat conditional
expressions. This is the way we understand cea’s and this is the level on
which we will criticize them.
Probabilistic models and cea ’s. First of all, we do not think that the
algebraic structure of a cea is particularly important. The language of flat
conditional expressions does not have equality, so what is really crucial are
the probabilities. The algebraic structure can indeed be an obstacle while
assigning probabilities (this is perhaps why the authors of the earlier papers
devoted so much attention to it), but otherwise we are not so much interested
in it.
Next, what a cea assigns to a conditional expression is definitely too little.
Apart from an element of M0 and probability, an experiment should be de-
termined to verify experimentally the value of the probability. This means,
that the objects assigned to conditional expressions should be events in a
probabilistic space, i.e., the triple (Ωo,Mo,Pro) should be indeed a proba-
bility space. Moreover, the experiments for simple conditionals (a|b) should
correspond to the natural experiments one performs to learn conditional
probabilities. In such experiments one can typically measure another proba-
bilistic parameters, like, e.g., the probability that (a|b) is defined. We think
such additional parameters should be assigned to compound conditional
events, too. Of course, in the existing algebras we have hints concerning it,
hidden in their universes and other details of the constructions, provided by
the inventors, but the very definition of a cea does not require the additional
parameters to be even defined, let alone to satisfy any reasonable properties.
Strictly speaking, the signature of cea’s is too small. In its present shape
it permits existence of other, isomorphic algebras, where all the additional
information is lost.
Last, but not least, in the applications of classical probability theory one of-
ten encounters problems in modeling, typically of the following form: one has
an event, whose meaning is completely clear (it is known, when it happens
and when it doesn’t), but there is a problem of specifying the probability
space structure, and sometimes different choices lead to different values for
the probability of the same event. In such circumstances one can only experi-
mentally decide which of the models is the correct one. A standard example
is the difference between the so called statistics of: Maxwell-Boltzmann,
Bose-Einstein and Fermi-Dirac, considered in quantum physics, and the un-
successful search for any elementary particle, which would satisfy the first
statistics, seemingly the most natural one among them (therefore we have
bosons and fermions, but we do not have maxwellons in physics) [Fel68].
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The tremendous success of probability theory in applications seems to sug-
gest this is the right way of creating a mathematical model of a real life
situation. However, the cea offers us another challenge. Even after coming
up with the proper model of probability space of unconditional events, one
still has a lot of work to choose the right model for conditional events.
In plain words, it means that the structure modeling conditional events over
a given probabilistic space of unconditional events, should be functorial:
given the former space, the space of conditional events ought to be uniquely
determined. Here the cea’s again fall short of satisfying this requirement,
because there are many known cea’s, and each of them has its own defini-
tion of (a|b) ∧ (c|d), with its own probability, and all of them derive their
definitions from certain first principles. The answer is almost obvious — the
signature is too small, and should consist of many different conjunctions,
disjunctions and negations, and perhaps lots of other connectives, which do
not have any natural counterparts in the nonconditional world.
(TL|TL) as a solution. We believe that our system of temporal condi-
tional events addresses all of the problems we have indicated above.
Our conditional events belong to a normal probability space. They are
indeed stochastic processes — projections of Markov chains, and all their
probabilistic properties (many more than just the bare probability) can be
verified experimentally,
To the contrary, all the cea’s we call present tense in this paper have a natural
representation as algebras of 3-valued indicator functions [GNW91, Chapter
3]. Recalling that every event from Σ can be equivalently characterized by its
2-valued indicator random variable, which is nothing but the characteristic
function, we should naturally expect that the lifting of Pr to the space of
3-valued indicator functions, should consist of 3-valued random variables,
while the definition of a cea requires just elements of a strange algebra
Mo and numbers. In case of our temporal conditionals, we naturally expect
conditionals to be functions Ω∞ → 3∞, and hence the lifting of Pr to consist
of random functions, which are nothing but stochastic processes, the choice
we actually have made. This is the natural pattern one should follow, and
this is where the scalability of the model is hidden. E.g., nothing could
prevent us from considering continuous time stochastic processes as models
of conditional events, if need be.
The space of conditional events is uniquely determined by the probabilistic
space of nonconditional events, and has many more natural connectives than
just three. In fact, we are not very original here: already Schay [Sch68]
proposed a system with five connectives, and considered adding even more
of them.
Finally, to make our argument complete, we consider the major cea’s below,
and show that they embed in our models, in many different ways. For
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the product space cea, we employ the embeddings to demonstrate that this
cea has some further defects. The existence of multiple embeddings shows
that the structure of a cea’s isn’t functorial just because there are many
known cea’s, but because the structure of a cea does not prescribe the way
the conditionals relate to nonconditional events. Additionally, the product
space cea is unable to characterize independence of conditional events by
means of equalities of probabilities.
4.3 Present tense cea’s
In our framework, there is a distinctive class of cea’s, which we call present
tense cea’s. The definitions of their connectives refer to the present of the
process, only, hence the name. Consequently, such a connective applied to
simple conditionals yields simple conditionals, again. Among such systems
are SAC, proposed independently by Schay [Sch68], Adams [Ada86] and
Calabrese [Cal87] (who extended it by an operator for re-conditioning), and
GNW proposed by Goodman [Goo87] and Goodman, Nguyen and Walker
[GNW91] (later Goodman and Nguyen [GN95] proposed a re-conditioning
operator for GNW). They assume that all boolean combinations of simple
conditional expressions yield simple conditional expressions again. The def-
initions of their connectives are given in Section 3.1. They do form cea’s.
Equivalently, [GNW91, Chapter 3], these algebras can be characterized as
algebras of 3-valued indicator functions, and their connectives are then char-
acterized by mappings from certain Cartesian power of 3 into 3.
We take the second point of view, and define their semantics as follows.
Our definition assigns to every conditional expression e a 3-valued indica-
tor function 〈〈e〉〉SAC and 〈〈e〉〉GNW, respectively. For us, indicator functions
are nothing else than present tense conditionals. (Originally these algebras
do not involve time.) So, we give the definition by describing translations
〈〈·〉〉SAC, 〈〈·〉〉GNW : L → C. We use in the translations present tense connec-
tives of conditionals defined in (6).
The definition of SAC:
〈〈(a|b)〉〉SAC = (a|b),
〈〈e ∧ e′〉〉SAC = 〈〈e〉〉SAC ∧SAC 〈〈e
′〉〉SAC,
〈〈e ∨ e′〉〉SAC = 〈〈e〉〉SAC ∨SAC 〈〈e
′〉〉SAC,
〈〈∼e〉〉SAC =∼0〈〈e〉〉SAC,
〈〈(e|e′)〉〉SAC = (〈〈e〉〉SAC|SAC〈〈e
′〉〉SAC).
(9)
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The definition of GNW:
〈〈(a|b)〉〉GNW = (a|b),
〈〈e ∧ e′〉〉GNW = 〈〈e〉〉GNW ∧GNW 〈〈e
′〉〉GNW,
〈〈e ∨ e′〉〉GNW = 〈〈e〉〉GNW ∨GNW 〈〈e
′〉〉GNW,
〈〈∼e〉〉GNW =∼0〈〈e〉〉GNW,
〈〈(e|e′)〉〉GNW = (〈〈e〉〉GNW|GNW〈〈e
′〉〉GNW).
(10)
Given a probability space (Ω,P(Ω),Pr), the probability of a conditional
expression e is PrSAC(e) = Pr(〈〈e〉〉SAC = 1)/Pr(〈〈e〉〉SAC 6= ⊥), and similarly
PrGNW(e) = Pr(〈〈e〉〉GNW = 1)/Pr(〈〈e〉〉GNW 6= ⊥), provided that the denom-
inators are nonzero.
All theses systems are readily seen to embed in our system of conditionals.
In fact, if one represents them in the form of reduction rules, as in (6), they
do even embed syntactically in the (TL|TL) logic. They are present tense
because they do not contain temporal connectives.
4.4 Product space cea
However, there is another cea, called the product space cea, which is not
present tense. In order to analyze it and show that it can be interpreted in
our model, we have to give the definition.
The semantics is as follows:
Beginning with (Ω,M,Pr), we form its countable power Ω∞ endowed with
the product measure. The cylinder b× · · · × b︸ ︷︷ ︸
j
×a × Ω × Ω × · · · ⊆ Ω∞ for
a, b ∈ Σ is denoted bj × a× Ωˆ.
Define the semantics function 〈〈·〉〉PS : PS→ P(Ω
∞) by
〈〈(a|PSb)〉〉PS =
∞⋃
i=0
(Ω \ b)j × (b ∩ a)× Ωˆ,
〈〈e ∧ e′〉〉PS = 〈〈e〉〉PS ∩ 〈〈e
′〉〉PS,
〈〈e ∨ e′〉〉PS = 〈〈e〉〉PS ∪ 〈〈e
′〉〉PS,
〈〈∼e〉〉PS = Ω
∞ \ 〈〈e〉〉PS.
Mo of the product space cea is then the subalgebra of the (boolean) algebra
〈P(Ω∞),∪,∩, (Ω∞ \ ·)〉, generated by all elements bj × a× Ωˆ where a, b ∈ Σ,
and Pro is the product measure.
There are indeed two versions of PS: one defined in the paper [Goo94], where
equality of two conditionals is understood as true equality of sets, and an-
other, defined in [GMN97], where the equality of conditionals is understood
as equality almost everywhere, i.e., two conditional events of PS are equal
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iff their symmetric difference has probability 0. The latter is therefore not
logical, since it depends on the particular probability space structure.
The probabilities assigned to the elements of PS are those according to the
infinite product of Pr .
4.5 First embedding
In order to construct the first embedding of PS into C by defining two
operations σ(·) : L→ TL and τ(·) : L→ (TL|TL) as follows:
σ((a|b)) = first2(a|b)
σ(e ∧ e′) = σ(e) ∧ σ(e′)
σ(e ∨ e′) = σ(e) ∨ σ(e′)
σ(∼e) = ¬σ(e)
τ(e) = (σ(e)|true).
(11)
τ(e) (or, more formally, the conditional from C represented by the former)
is the desired embedding.
Lemma 6. For every expression e ∈ L
1. For every word w ∈ Ω∞ holds (τ(e))∞(w) ∈ 2
∞;
2. Suppose (a1|b1), . . . , (an|bn) are all simple conditionals occurring in e.
Suppose w ∈ Ω∞ is so that bi1 , . . . , bik are all events among b1, . . . , bn
which happen in the sequence w, and all of them happen not later than
at time m. Then of the word (τ(e))∞(w) is constant beginning since
time m.
3. 〈〈e〉〉PS = {w ∈ Ω
∞ / (τ(e))∞(w) is eventually constant 1};
4. Pro(e) = Pr(τ(e));
Proof. The proof of 1., 2. and 3. goes by simultaneous induction w.r.t. e.
For e = (a|b) they follows from a simple analysis of the definition of 〈〈e〉〉PS
and first2(a|b).
Now consider e = ¬e′ and assume by induction that 1., 2. and 3. hold for
e′. Since σ(¬e) = ¬σ(e′), we have 1. and 2. immediately.
Moreover, (¬σ(e′)|true)∞(w) is eventually constant 1 iff (σ(e
′)|true)∞(w) is
eventually constant 0, which by 1. and 2. for e′ is equivalent to the fact that
(σ(e′)|true)∞(w) is not eventually constant 1. This concludes the induction
step of 3.
Induction steps for the other connectives are equally simple.
We turn now to 4. Suppose (a1|b1), . . . , (an|bn) are all simple conditionals
occurring in a conditional expression ϕ. W.l.o.g. assume Pr(bi) > 0 for
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i = 1, . . . , k and Pr(bi) = 0 for i = k + 1, . . . , n. (We permit k = 0 and
k = n, in which cases either all bi are impossible, or all of them have positive
probability.)
Represent Ω∞ as a disjoint union of sets
An := {w ∈ Ω
∞ /
b1, . . . , bk happen in w and the first time
when they all have already happened is n
}
and the set A∞ := {w ∈ Ω
∞ / not all of b1, . . . , bk happen in w}. All these
sets are clearly measurable.
It is not hard to see that the (product) probability of A∞ is 0, so Pro(e) =∑
n∈N
An⊆〈〈e〉〉PS
Pr(An).
It is not hard to verify, either, that
lim
n→∞
∑
m∈N
Prn(Am) = 1.
These two equalities imply 4. immediately, since for every n
∑
m∈N
Am⊆〈〈e〉〉PS
Prn(Am) ≤ Prn(τ(e)) ≤ 1−
∑
m∈N
Am∩〈〈e〉〉PS=∅
Prn(Am).
The following theorem follows now instantly.
Theorem 7. τ(·) is an embedding of the PS cea into C, in the sense that
for any underlying probability space, and any conditional expressions e, e′,
τ(e) = τ(e′) iff 〈〈e〉〉PS = 〈〈e
′〉〉PS, and Pr(τ(e)) = Pro(e).
4.6 Reverse embeddings
Definition 8. The reverse of a word w = ω1 . . . ωn ∈ Ω
+, denoted wR, is
ωnωn−1 . . . ω1.
Now consider a conditional c ∈ C. Then cR ∈ C is a conditional defined by
cR(w) := c(wR).
The class of languages definable in TL is reverse-closed [Eme90], i.e., if
L = {w / w, |w| |= ϕ} for some ϕ ∈ TL, then LR = {wR / w ∈ L} =
{w / w, |w| |= ψ} for someϕ ∈ TL. It follows that cR is indeed a conditional
in our sense.
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Theorem 9. For every ⋆ ∈ 3
Pr([[c]]n = ⋆) = Pr([[c
R]]n = ⋆).
Consequently, Pro(c) = Pr(c
R).
Proof. Pr is understood here as a product measure, which is insensitive to
the order of its coordinates.
It follows that any cea, which can be at all isomorphically embedded in our
stochastic process model, has at least two embeddings, which are reverses
of each other. The only exception is when the embedding is invariant under
reverse, i.e., when each conditional c in the image of the embedding satisfies
c(w) = c(wR) for all w ∈ Ω+. However, it seems unlikely that any reasonable
embedding has this property. In particular, the natural embeddings of the
cea’s we consider here are not of this kind.
As a matter of example, we consider here PS. For the PS conjunction, its
informal description of its reverse representation in C is that it is always
defined and true iff the most recent defined values of its both arguments
were 1.
In (TL|TL), we have that τR((a|b) ∧ (c|d)) (the reverse of the embedding
τ(·) defined in (11)) is defined by ((b∁ Since(a ∧ b)) ∧ (d∁ Since(c ∧ d))|true),
whose Moore machine is depicted below.
The precise definition of the reverse embedding of PS is as follows: first,
we take the original conditional expression e = e((a1|b1), . . . , (am|bm)) and
replace every (ai|bi) occurring in it by b
∁
i Since(ai ∧ bi), obtaining e
′ ∈ TL,
and then define τR(e) := (e′|true). Formally:
σR((a|b)) = b∁ Since(a ∧ b)
σR(e ∧ e′) = σR(e) ∧ σR(e′)
σR(e ∨ e′) = σR(e) ∨ σR(e′)
σR(∼e) = ¬σR(e)
τR(e) = (σR(e)|true).
(12)
For this particular embedding, we have the following consequence of Theo-
rem 9 (and the simple fact that reversing is an automorphism of the whole
(TL|TL))
Theorem 10. τR(·) is an embedding of the PS cea into C, in the sense that
for any underlying probability space, and any conditional expressions e, e′,
τR(e) = τR(e′) iff 〈〈e〉〉PS = 〈〈e
′〉〉PS, and Pr(τ
R(e)) = Pro(e).
20
ONMLHIJK0 
c∁d∧(ab)∁
}}
}}
}}
}}
}}
~~}}
}}
}}
}}
}}
}}
}}
}}
}}
}}
}
abc∁d




























ab∧(c∁d)∁
00
00
00
0

00
00
00
00
00
00
00
0
ONMLHIJK0 abcd //
cd∧(ab)∁
}}}}}}}}}}
>>}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
ab∧(cd)∁
00
00
00
0

00
00
00
00
00
00
00
0
ONMLHIJK1
mm
a∁bc∁d
oo
c∁d∧(a∁b)∁
}}
}}
}}
}}
}}
~~}}
}}
}}
}}
}}
}}
}}
}}
}}
}}
}
a∁b∧(c∁d)∁0000000
XX000000000000000
;;wwwwwwwwwwww
ONMLHIJK0
OO
cd∧(a∁b)∁
}}}}}}}}}}
>>}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
a∁bcd






KK














a∁b∧(ab)∁0000000
XX000000000000000
Figure 3: Moore machine of τR((a|b) ∧ (c|d)).
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4.7 Sparse reverse embedding
We give a new, radically different interpretation of PS in C. The main dif-
ference is that it is not an embedding. We are going to present a way to
interpret PS expressions in C so that, for any probability space (Ω,P(Ω),Pr),
the Pro-probability of a PS-expression is equal to the asymptotic probabil-
ity of its interpretation. However, expressions which yield equal element of
the PS cea, may well give distinct conditional events in C, although, as said
before, these expressions will have equal asymptotic probabilities.
First of all , we redefine the meaning of simple conditionals (a|b). According
to the new embedding, they are represented by (TL|TL) formula
(a ∧ ¬(¬b ∨ ¬ ✉true)|b ∨ ¬ b).
Denote this formula by (a|Sb).
It is essentially the simple conditional (a|b) ∈ (TL|TL), except that it is
defined and false until b becomes true for the very first time, and since then
behaves exactly like (a|b) does in (TL|TL). The manipulation is necessary
to accommodate the PS principle, that degenerate simple conditionals, like
(a|0), do have probability, and that it is 0.
We now define the sparse reverse interpretation of PS in C as follows: First,
we take the original conditional expression e = e((a1|b1), . . . , (am|bm)) and
set τRS(e) = (σR(e)|
∨m
i=1(bi∨¬ bi)), where σ
R(·) has been defined in (12).
The conjunction and disjunction are defined precisely when at least one of
the arguments is defined, so they resemble the connectives of SAC in this
respect, but instead of assigning the other arguments default values when
they are undefined, like SAC does, their most recent defined values are
always used, instead. Here is an example Moore machine, in which we use
ǫ-moves. The graphical representation in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 shows that the
new operation is closely related to the reversed product space conjunction,
as can be expected from the shape of the (TL|TL) representation.
Lemma 11. If Pr(bi) = 0 for at least one 1 ≤ i ≤ m, then Pr(τ
RS(e)) =
Pr(τ(e)).
Proof. In this case, assuming Pr(bi) = 0, we have that
∨m
i=1(bi ∨ ¬ bi)) is
true with probability 1, hence [[τRS(e)]] = [[τR(e)]] with probability 1. Now
the thesis follows immediately from Theorem 10.
Lemma 12. If Pr(bi) > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, then Pr(τ
RS(e)) = Pro(τ(e)).
Proof. Let e = e((a1|b1, . . . , (an|bn)). We prove Pr(τ
R(e)) = Pr(τRS(e)),
which is, by Theorem 10, equivalent to what we have to show.
Denote t = the first moment m when all the bi’s have already been defined.
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Figure 4: Moore machine of τRS((a|b) ∧ (c|d)), part 1. This part of the
machine is the transient part of the Markov chain, when Pr(b),Pr(d) >
0 (Lemma 12) and the whole reachable part when at least one of these
probabilities is 0 (Lemma 11).
Subscripts of the state labels indicate the most recent value of (a|b) and
(c|d), respectively.
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Figure 5: Moore machine of τRS((a|b) ∧ (c|d)), part 2. This part of the
machine is the (only) ergodic class of the Markov chain, when Pr(b),Pr(d) >
0 (Lemma 12), and is unreachable when at least one of these probabilities
is 0 (Lemma 11).
Subscripts of the state labels indicate the most recent value of (a|b) and
(c|d), respectively.
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Missing arrows
From To Label
0⊥⊥, 0⊥0, 0⊥1, 01⊥, 00⊥ 000 a
∁bc∁d
0⊥⊥, 0⊥0, 0⊥1, 01⊥, 00⊥ 001 a
∁bcd
0⊥⊥, 0⊥0, 0⊥1, 01⊥, 00⊥ 010 abc
∁d
0⊥⊥, 0⊥0, 0⊥1, 01⊥, 00⊥ 111 abcd
01⊥ 111 b
∁cd
00⊥ 001 b
∁cd
01⊥ 010 b
∁c∁d
00⊥ 000 b
∁c∁d
0⊥1 111 abd
∁
0⊥0 010 abd
∁
0⊥1 001 a
∁bd∁
0⊥0 000 a
∁bd∁
Figure 6: Moore machine of τRS((a|b) ∧ (c|d)), part 3. This part of the
machine is the table of the transitions from the “transient” part (Fig. 4) to
the “ergodic” part (Fig. 5).
Let us note that, if t < n, then the event [[τRS(e)]]n = ⊥ is independent
of the whole history of [[τRS(e)]] up to time n − 1. This is so because the
decision whether [[τRS(e)]]n is defined or not depends solely on the present
time values of bi’s, and their present time values become independent of the
(strict) past, when the condition
∨n
i=1 ¬ bi becomes for the first time false,
because it remains then false forever, and the “given” part of τRS(e) does
not contain any other time modalities.
Moreover, whenever [[τRS(e)]](ω1 . . . ωn) 6= ⊥, then in fact τ
RS(e)(ω1 . . . ωn) =
τR(e)(ω1 . . . ωn), which is clear from the syntactic representation of both
conditional objects.
Denote for convenience
q = Pr([[τRS(e)]]n = ⊥|t < n) = 1−Pr(
∨m
i=1 bi) < 1, as well as and c = τ
R(e)
and cS = τRS(e).
Fix ε > 0. Let M be large enough to have Pr(t ≥M) < ε. Let N be a large
integer, and let n satisfy n−N > M.
We have then by the independence
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Pr([[c]]n = 1) ≥
N∑
i=0
Pr([[cS]]n−i = 1)Pr([[c
S]]n−i+1 = ⊥) . . .Pr([[c
S]]n = ⊥)− ε,
Pr([[c]]n = 0) ≥
N∑
i=0
Pr([[cS]]n−i = 0)Pr([[c
S]]n−i+1 = ⊥) . . .Pr([[c
S]]n = ⊥)− ε,
where the ε error terms are caused by the event that t ≥M.
Because each of the Pr(. . . ) expressions above tends to a limit as n ap-
proaches infinity, we get
Pr(c) ≥
N∑
i=0
lim
n→∞
Pr([[cS]]n−i = 1) lim
n→∞
Pr([[cS]]n−i+1 = ⊥) · · ·Pr([[c
S]]n = ⊥)− ε,
=
N∑
i=0
lim
n→∞
Pr([[cS]]n = 1) lim
n→∞
Pr([[cS]]n = ⊥) · · ·Pr([[c
S]]n = ⊥)− ε
=
N∑
i=0
lim
n→∞
Pr([[cS]]n = 1)( lim
n→∞
Pr([[cS]]n = ⊥))
i − ε
=
N∑
i=0
lim
n→∞
Pr([[cS]]n = 1)q
i − ε
=
1− qN
1− q
lim
n→∞
Pr([[cS]]n = 1)− ε,
and similarly
1− Pr(c) ≥
1− qN
1− q
lim
n→∞
Pr([[cS]]n = 0)− ε.
In the limit N →∞ both inequalities become
Pr(c) ≥
1
1− q
lim
n→∞
Pr([[cS]]n = 1)− ε
1− Pr(c) ≥
1
1− q
lim
n→∞
Pr([[cS]]n = 0)− ε,
hence
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Pr(c) ≥
1
1− q
lim
n→∞
Pr([[cS]]n = 1)− ε
Pr(c) ≤ 1−
1
1− q
lim
n→∞
Pr([[cS]]n = 0) + ε
=
1
1− q
(1− q − lim
n→∞
Pr([[cS]]n = 0)) + ε
=
1
1− q
lim
n→∞
Pr([[cS]]n = 1) + ε,
because 1 = Pr([[cS]]n = 1) + Pr([[c
S]]n = 0) + Pr([[c
S]]n = ⊥), in which the
last term is constant equal q.
We took an arbitrary ε > 0, therefore indeed
Pr(cS) =
1
1− q
lim
n→∞
Pr([[cS]]n = 1),
and likewise
1− Pr(cS) =
1
1− q
lim
n→∞
Pr([[cS]]n = 0).
From the last two equalities the equality Pr(c) = Pr(cS) follows immediately.
Summing up,
Theorem 13. For every conditional expression e and every probability as-
signment to the elements in Ω, Pro(e) = Pr(τ
RS(e)).
The very important consequence of the theorem is the following:
Corollary 14. The formalism of PS cea, seen as a logic of conditionals,
is unable to determine certain probabilistic characteristics, other than the
asymptotic probability, associated with stochastic processes.
Proof. PS possesses two interpretations in C, one of which consists entirely of
always defined temporal conditionals (the τ(·) embedding), while the second
contains conditionals which are defined with asymptotic probability strictly
less than 1 (the τRS(·) interpretation).
Another similar example of deficiencies of the PS cea can be found below,
Theorem 28.
Let us note that the τRS(·) interpretation does not preserve the algebraic
structure of the PS cea, in general. Indeed, already 〈〈(0|a)〉〉PS = 〈〈(0|b)〉〉PS,
while τRS((0|a)) = (a|Sb) and τ
RS((0|b)) = (0|Sb) represent different condi-
tional objects, for a 6= b, a, b ∈ E.
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5 Advantages of (TL|TL) conditionals
5.1 Complexity and proof systems
The paper [Goo94] asks for the proof systems for various three-valued logics,
appearing in the context of the theory of conditionals.
In order to discuss this issue, we use the machinery of complexity theory.
All the necessary definitions can be found in [HU79].
As we prove below, for all of the major cea’s, the sets of weak tautologies
are coNP complete.
In the light of the above results, there is a little hope for a practically
useful proof system for the most prominent systems among GNW and SAC.
Indeed, unless NP = coNP, a very unlikely complexity-theoretic collapse,
for every sound and complete proof system for the two above logics, there
must be weak tautologies of length n such that their shortest proofs are of
superpolynomial length w.r.t. n, for infinitely many n.
Temporal logic is known to be PSPACE-complete, Theorem 1. It is therefore
obvious that the set of weak tautologies of (TL|TL), consisting of all expres-
sions (ϕ|ψ) such that for every w ∈ 3+, (ϕ|ψ)(w) ∈ {1,⊥} (equivalently:
that ψ → ϕ is a tautology of TL), is PSPACE-complete, too.
Although it is commonly believed that coNP ( PSPACE, from practical
standpoint both admit exponential time algorithms, and no better ones are
known. Consequently, the practical algorithmic difference between cea’s and
(TL|TL) is not so crucial. The advantage of considering cea’s as subsystems
of (TL|TL) stems from the fact that a lot is known about proof systems for
temporal logic — unlike for cea’s.
We are not interested in the complexity of cea’s as logics involving terms
(a|b) as atoms, but rather as 3-valued logics. To explain the difference, let
us note that in the calculus of any of the cea’s one can easily restrict atoms
to be two-valued (e.g., by using only atoms of the form (a|1)), and thus all
the complexity questions trivialize, the sets of tautologies of all the logics
are coNP-complete. Here, we assume that the atoms can always assume all
three logical values, and are effectively variables. Hence we indeed view our
(weak) tautologies as a kind of (weak) meta-tautologies, i.e., formulas which
evaluate to either 1 or ⊥, no matter what the arguments are.
Formally, for this section we modify L and L| replacing simple conditionals
(a|b) by variables p1, p2, . . . in conditional expressions.
Likewise, given a valuation v : {p1, p2, . . . } → 3, we let 〈〈·〉〉
v
SAC and 〈〈·〉〉
v
GNW
assign values in 3 to expressions in L|. These values are determined by the
equations in (9) and (10).
An expression e is a weak tautology of SAC cea (GNW cea, respectively) iff
〈〈e〉〉vSAC 6= 0 (〈〈e〉〉
v
GNW 6= 0, respectively) for every v.
e is a strong tautology of SAC (GNW, respectively), iff the above values are
1 for every v.
28
We consider the complexity problem of determining if an expression e is a
weak tautology according to each of the considered cea’s, considering also
some syntactical restrictions put on the syntactical shape of e.
We do not consider strong tautologies, which is explained by the following.
Proposition 15. In GNW and SAC there are no strong tautologies.
Proof. All connectives have value ⊥ if all their arguments are ⊥, for both
SAC and GNW.
Occasionally, we want to consider L| as the syntax of classical logic. In this
case, given a valuation v : {p1, p2, . . . } → 2, the value 〈〈e〉〉
v
CL ∈ 2 is computed
according to the classical rules, where the conditioning | is understood as
reverse implication: (a|b) is a← b.
Pure conditional parts. We consider here pure conditional fragments of
SAC and GNW, i.e., expressions in which the only connective used is |.
It shows that unlimited use of re-conditioning leads to coNP-completeness
of the weak tautology problem.
Theorem 16. It is an coNP-complete problem to determine if an expression
e ∈ L| involving only re-conditioning is a weak tautology of SAC.
It is an coNP-complete problem to determine if an expression e ∈ L| involv-
ing only re-conditioning is a weak tautology of GNW.
Proof. It is obvious that the sets of weak tautologies in both cases are in
coNP. So it remains to prove their hardness in this complexity class.
It is easily seen that the (re-)conditioning operators of both GNW and SAC
satisfy the following property: the equivalence relation ≈ on 3 identifying 1
with ⊥ is a congruence of A = 〈3, |SAC〉 andB = 〈3, |GNW〉, and the quotient
algebras both A = 〈3, |SAC〉/≈ and B = 〈3, |GNW〉/≈ are isomorphic to the
2-element algebra with the reversed classical implication 〈2,←〉. The natural
epimorphism ηA : A → 〈2,←〉 sends 1 and ⊥ to 1, and 0 to 0, and the
definition of ηB is identical.
Therefore a pure conditional expression is a weak tautology of either of the
considered cea’s iff it is a classical tautology, after its (re-)conditioning oper-
ator is replaced by the reversed classical implication. The classical formula
resulting from this replacement is denoted e¯.
We have to prove that e is not a weak tautology iff e¯ is not a tautology.
Let v be any valuation of the variables of e in 3. Now we use the natural
epimorphism ηA and get
〈〈e¯〉〉ηA◦vCL = ηA(〈〈e〉〉
v
SAC).
So if one of the values above can be 0, the other can be, as well, which
establishes the desired equivalence.
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Since it is known that the tautologies of the classical propositional logic of
pure implication are coNP complete [Heu95], the claim follows.
As a by-product we have
Corollary 17. The sets of pure conditional weak tautologies of SAC and
GNW are identical.
Flat parts. Here we consider SAC and GNW without re-conditioning.
We can define the following NP-complete problem 3CNF-SAT.
Given: an expression e ∈ L of the following syntactical form:
e = (ℓ11 ∨ ℓ12 ∨ ℓ13) ∧ (ℓ21 ∨ ℓ22 ∨ ℓ23) ∧ · · · ∧ (ℓs1 ∨ ℓs2 ∨ ℓs3), (13)
where each of the ℓij is either pj or ∼pj.
The NP-complete problem is: given e of the above shape, determine if e is
satisfiable, i.e, if there exists v such that 〈〈e〉〉vCL = 1.
It follows that it is coNP-complete to determine, given e as above, if e is not
satisfiable, i.e., whether 〈〈∼e〉〉vCL = 1 for every v.
In order to prove coNP-completeness of the sets of weak tautologies of either
of the cea’s, we have to construct a polynomial time computable transfor-
mation e 7→ e¯ translating e of the form (13) into e¯ of the form conforming
to the restriction set in the respective theorem, and such that ∼ e is not
satisfiable in the classical sense iff e¯ is a weak tautology of the respective
logic.
Theorem 18. It is an coNP-complete problem to determine if an expression
e ∈ L is a weak tautology of SAC.
It is an coNP-complete problem to determine if an expression e ∈ L is a
weak tautology of GNW.
Proof. It is easily seen that the connectives ∧GNW and ∨GNW satisfy again
the property that the equivalence relation ≈ on 3 identifying 1 with ⊥ is a
congruence of the algebra with the above functions, and the quotient algebra
〈3,∧GNW,∨GNW〉
/
≈ is isomorphic to the classical 〈2,∧,∨〉. This fails about
the negation, however.
As the negation is applied to atoms only in 3CNF-SAT, we do not have
to use the negation of GNW directly. Instead, we introduce new variables
to denote the negations, and force them to behave correctly outside of the
translation of e.
Formally, let the mapping e 7→ e′ from the classical propositional logic into
GNW be defined by replacing unnegated atoms p in e by pˆ and negated
atoms ∼p by pˇ. Concerning binary connectives, we leave ∧ and ∨ untouched.
Then let e¯ be defined as ∼ (e′ ∧
∧
p
(pˆ ∨ pˇ) ∧ (∼ pˆ∨ ∼ pˇ)), where p in the big
conjunction ranges over all propositional variables of e.
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Certainly the mapping e 7→ e¯ is computable in polynomial time. In order to
show the coNP completeness of the set of tautologies of GNW, it suffices to
show two implications:
• if e is satisfiable classically, then e¯ is not a weak tautology of GNW.
• if then e¯ is not a weak tautology of GNW, then e is satisfiable classi-
cally.
For the first item, assume that e is satisfiable, i.e., there is an assignment v
of 0’s and 1’s to the propositional variables of e which makes e into 1. We
construct a 3-valued assignment w which makes e¯ into 0. If v(p) = 1, we let
w(pˆ) = 1 and w(pˇ) = 0. If v(p) = 0, we let w(pˆ) = 0 and w(pˇ) = 1. In e′ each
variable has under w exactly the value of the corresponding literal in e has
under v. So e′ evaluates to 1, because connectives in GNW behave classically
for classical arguments. In addition, each of the formulas (pˆ∨ pˇ)∧(∼ pˆ∨ ∼ pˇ)
evaluates to 1, so altogether e¯ evaluates to the ∼ 0-negation of the value to
which e′ does evaluate, which is 0, as desired.
For the second item, assume there is an assignment w of 0’s, 1’s and ⊥’s to
the propositional variables of e¯ which makes it 0. It follows that each of the
terms (pˆ∨ pˇ)∧(∼ pˆ∨ ∼ pˇ) must evaluate to 1 under w. Therefore of each pair
pˆ, pˇ, one variable must be assigned 1 and the other 0 by w, which can be
checked by simple inspection of all possibilities. Moreover, e′ must evaluate
to 1 under w, which is indeed 2-valued, by the previous observation. The
connectives of GNW act classically for classical arguments, therefore e is
indeed classically satisfiable, by the valuation v : p 7→ w(pˆ).
This finishes the proof.
Theorem 19. The weak flat-conditional SAC is coNP-complete.
Proof. We are going to use the same proof idea as before. However, we have
a small problem. The conjunction of SAC does not permit us to deduce,
that if a conjunction of two formulas evaluates to 1, so does each of the
components.
So instead of the original conjunction, we have to use some custom connec-
tive defined from the conjunction, disjunction and negation, which will act
as a “good” conjunction, for which the inference does hold. It turn out,
that the conjunction of GNW is not definable in SAC, but there is another
connective we can use instead, and which is definable (we discuss the defin-
ability of connectives in SAC and GNW in another paper [CWTHR01]). Its
definition is as follows:
x ⊓ y ≡ [x ∨ (y ∧ (x∨ ∼y))] ∧ [y ∨ (x ∧ (y∨ ∼x))].
It is not difficult (but tedious) to check, that 〈〈x ⊓ y〉〉SAC has truth table
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x ⊓ y
xy 0 1 ⊥
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
⊥ 0 0 ⊥
,
which is exactly what we need for our purposes. The only subtle point is
that our x ⊔ y is substantially longer than |x| + |y|. Indeed it is about 4
times longer. We do replace ∧ by ⊓ in very long conjunctions. However,
if we represent this long conjunction as a balanced binary (parse) tree, i.e.,
insert brackets to obtain the structure
(((. . . ⊓ . . . ) ⊓ (. . . ⊓ . . . )) ⊓ ((. . . ⊓ . . . ) ⊓ (. . . ⊓ . . . ))),
the depth of nesting of conjunctions is at most log base 2 of the number
N of clauses in the conjunction, and the total increase of length caused by
the replacement is 4depth of nesting = 4log2 N = N2. Altogether, the resulting
formula, using ⊓ in place of ∧, is still of polynomial size, and can be easily
constructed in polynomial time, as needed.
5.2 Independence of conditional events
There has been a considerable amount of interest in the independence issue
for conditional events, reflected in the cea literature [Goo94, Cal97, Pea88].
The problem is that typically even for a and b mutually independent of c
and d one does not have Pr((a|b)∧ (c|d)) = Pr((a|b)) Pr((c|d)). The only ex-
ception is PS, where this equality holds. The other variant of independence:
Pr((a|b)|(c|d)) = Pr((a|b)) is undefined in some formalisms, due to the lack
of re-conditioning operator, and fails in others. However, note that in the
cea framework one cannot obtain any proper characterization of indepen-
dence, because there is no underlying probabilistic semantics, in which one
could say which pairs of conditionals are independent and which aren’t, and
then attempt to characterize this by equalities among probabilities. One
feels that (a|b) and (c|d) should be independent for mutually independent
arguments, but this is not more than a feeling, and there is no idea there
what might make two conditionals independent when their arguments are
not mutually independent, or when they are composite.
We can address this problem in our semantical setting. First of all, for a and
bmutually independent of c and d, the stochastic processes [[(a|b)]] and [[(c|d)]]
are obviously independent. And of course, the independence of the stochastic
processes is what the independence of conditionals should be. This remains
true, no matter which cea we consider. It is, however, a different story if this
independence can be formally characterized in terms of equalities between
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probabilities of conditionals in the cea under consideration. It appears that
in the pure cea formalism this cannot be achieved, because in Theorem 29
below we show that independence is undefinable in the PS cea.
To be precise, the full independence of stochastic processes X,Y means that
the full histories of both processes are independent, which is different from
the much less restrictive requirement that just the present time values should
be independent. The first version is formalized by the requirement that X+,t
and Y+,t are independent at any time t > 0, i.e., for any w1 . . . wt, v1 . . . vt ∈
3
t holds
Pr
(
X1 = w1, . . . , Xt = wt
Y1 = v1, . . . , Yt = vt
)
=
Pr(X1 = w1, . . . ,Xt = wt) Pr(Y1 = v1, . . . , Yt = vt).
The weaker, present tense independence requires only that Xt and Yt are
independent at any time t > 0, i.e., that for any w, v ∈ 3 holds Pr(Xt =
w, Yt = v) = Pr(Xt = w) Pr(Yt = v). To see the difference it is worth noting
that for any present tense (TL|TL) formula (ϕ|ψ) the processes [[(ϕ|ψ)]] and
[[( ✉ϕ| ✉ψ)]] are present tense independent, although of course they are easily
seen to be dependent, unless the former is constant.
But let us note the following simple fact.
Lemma 20. If c1 and c2 are two present tense conditionals, they are inde-
pendent iff they are present tense independent.
We know now what independence should mean. It is another story how to
characterize it in terms of the asymptotic probability of conditionals.
First we prove the characterization for present tense independence at fixed
time.
Let ↑(a|b) := (b|true).
Lemma 21. Let n be a fixed time instant. The following are equivalent:
• Random variables [[(a|b)]]n and [[(c|d)]]n are independent.
• The following four equalities hold:
Prn((a|b) ∧Sch (c|d)) = Prn((a|b)) Prn((c|d)) (14)
Prn((a|b) ∧Sch ↑(c|d)) = Prn((a|b)) Prn(↑(c|d)) (15)
Prn(↑(a|b) ∧Sch (c|d)) = Prn(↑(a|b)) Prn((c|d)) (16)
Prn(↑(a|b) ∧ ↑(c|d)) = Prn(↑(a|b)) Prn(↑(c|d)), (17)
where we assume an equation to hold in case when both sides are un-
defined.
33
Proof. ⇓ Independence of random variables [[(a|b)]]n and [[(c|d)]]n implies, in
particular, that
Pr([[(a|b)]]n = 0, 1, [[(c|d)]]n = 0, 1) = Pr([[(a|b)]]n = 0, 1)Pr([[(c|d)]]n = 0, 1),
(17′)
which is exactly equivalent to (17). The other consequences of independence
are equalities
Pr([[(a|b)]]n = 1, [[(c|d)]] = 1) = Pr([[(a|b)]]n = 1)Pr([[(c|d)]] = 1) (14
′)
Pr([[(a|b)]]n = 1, [[(c|d)]]n = 0, 1) = Pr([[(a|b)]]n = 1)Pr([[(c|d)]]n = 0, 1)
(15′)
Pr([[(a|b)]]n = 0, 1, [[(c|d)]]n = 1) = Pr([[(a|b)]]n = 0, 1)Pr([[(c|d)]]n = 1),
(16′)
which, divided by (17′), yield (14), (15) and (16), respectively. Note that if
both sides of (17′) are 0, then all the resulting equalities involve an undefined
term on both sides, and hence hold, according to our convention.
⇑ Let (17′) (i.e., (17)) hold. If its both sides are 0, the random variables
[[(a|b)]]n and [[(c|d)]]n are independent, because one of them is constant. So
let us assume (17′) holds and its both sides are nonzero. In particular, each
of the (14), (15) and (16) is defined on both sides, because the denominators
are everywhere nonzero. Multiplying these equalities by (17′), we get (14′),
(15′) and (16′), respectively. It is now a matter of routine to prove that the
independence of [[(a|b)]]n and [[(c|d)]]n follows from (14
′), (15′) and (16′) and
(17′).
The lemma allows us to characterize independence for present tense condi-
tionals.
Theorem 22. For present tense (a|b) and (c|d) the following are equivalent:
• Stochastic processes [[(a|b)]] and [[(c|d)]] are independent.
• The equalities (14)–(17) hold with Prn replaced by Pr in each term,
where we again assume an equation to hold in case when both sides
are undefined.
Proof. For present tense (a|b) the probability Prn((a|b)) is independent of
n, and is (of course) equal to Pr((a|b)). Now Lemmas 20 and 21 give us the
desired equivalence.
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The full characterization of independence for general temporal conditionals
is not known at the moment. Most likely, if it at all exists, it must be
nonuniform, in the sense that the number of equalities between probabilities
depends in principle on the actual (ϕ|ψ) and (ζ|ξ).
However, there is a quite general sufficient condition for independence, which
can be (nonuniformly) characterized by equalities of asymptotic probability.
Call two conditionals a, b strongly independent iff there exist stochastically
independent Markov chains X and Y and projections h, g such that [[a]] =
h(X) and [[b]] = g(Y).
Theorem 23. Strong independence of conditional events from (TL|TL) can
be equivalently characterized by equations of asymptotic probability.
We begin with
Lemma 24. Let Markov chains X,Y have n and m states, respectively. If
X and Y are independent until time mn+1, they are fully independent, i.e.,
if
Pr
(
X1 = w1, . . . , Xt = wt
Y1 = v1, . . . , Yt = vt
)
=
Pr(X1 = w1, . . . ,Xt = wt) Pr(Y1 = v1, . . . , Yt = vt) (18)
holds for all t ≤ mn+ 1 and all sequences w1, . . . , wt, v1, . . . , vt of states of
X and Y, respectively, then X and Y are independent and (18) holds indeed
for all t.
Proof. First of all, observe that (X,Y) = (X1, Y1), (X2, Y2), . . . is a Markov
chain, as well.
Suppose that (18) fails and that the least t for which it fails is t > mn+ 1
(because for t ≤ mn+ 1 (18) holds by assumption).
The in-equality
Pr
(
X1 = w1, . . . , Xt = wt
Y1 = v1, . . . , Yt = vt
)
6=
Pr(X1 = w1, . . . ,Xt = wt) Pr(Y1 = v1, . . . , Yt = vt) (19)
is by Markov property (2) for X, Y and (X,Y) equivalent to
Pr
(
X1 = w1, . . . , Xt−1 = wt−1
Y1 = v1, . . . , Yt−1 = vt−1
)
Pr
(
Xt = wt
Yt = vt
∣∣∣∣ Xt−1 = wt−1Yt−1 = vt−1
)
6=
Pr(X1 = w1, . . . ,Xt−1 = wt−1) Pr(Xt = wt|Xt−1 = wt−1)×
Pr(Y1 = v1, . . . , Yt−1 = vt−1) Pr(Yt = vt|Yt−1 = vt−1),
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which in turn is equivalent to
Pr
(
Xt = wt
Yt = vt
∣∣∣∣ Xt−1 = wt−1Yt−1 = vt−1
)
6=
Pr(Xt = wt|Xt−1 = wt−1) Pr(Yt = vt|Yt−1 = vt−1), (20)
because t is the least one for which in-equality holds, and so the non-
conditional probabilities in the previous in-equality cancel out.
Moreover, the canceling terms must be nonzero for the in-equality to hold,
which means (wt−1, vt−1) is reachable with positive probability from the
initial state in (X,Y). But therefore it must be reachable with positive prob-
ability in at most mn steps, because there are exactly so many states in
(X,Y). So let (xi, yi), i = 1, . . . , s ≤ mn be a sequence of states of (X,Y)
leading to (xs, ys) = (wt−1, vt−1) with positive probability. By assumption
Pr
(
X1 = x1, . . . , Xs = xs
Y1 = y1, . . . , Ys = vs
)
=
Pr(X1 = x1, . . . ,Xs = xs) Pr(Y1 = y1, . . . , Ys = vs), (21)
because s ≤ mn. If we now multiply the above by (20), we get, by a calcula-
tion reverse to what we have done above, an instance of (19) with t ≤ mn+1,
a contradiction.
Lemma 25. For given Markov chains X and Y and for a fixed time t, fixed
sequences w1, . . . , wt and v1, . . . , vt of states of X and Y, respectively, the for-
mula (18) can be equivalently characterized by equalities among asymptotic
probabilities of certain conditionals, derived from X and Y.
Proof. Let A and B be the deterministic finite automata, underlying X and
Y. For a state w of A let Aw be the Moore machine resulting from A by
labeling the state w with 1 and all the remaining states with 0. Since all
Aw’s are 2-valued, there exist TL formulas αw, which are true precisely when
the last symbol of the output of Aw is 1. Similarly we define Bv and βv .
Now (18) is equivalent to
Pr( ✉
t
true ∧ ¬ ✉
t+1
true ∧
t∧
i=1
( ✉
t−i
(αwi ∧ βvi))) =
Pr( ✉
t
true ∧ ¬ ✉
t+1
true ∧
t∧
i=1
( ✉
t−i
(αwi))) ×
Pr( ✉
t
true ∧ ¬ ✉
t+1
true ∧
t∧
i=1
( ✉
t−i
(βvi))).
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Each of the TL formulas asserts that it has been once that there was some-
thing t− 1 steps ago, but there was nothing t steps ago (so we have been at
time t precisely), and we were in the prescribed states of the Markov chain
in question at times: t, one step before that, . . . , t− 1 steps before that.
What remains to be seen is that we can indeed choose some canonical Markov
chains X and Y to represent a and b, which are independent whenever a and
b are strongly independent.
Let us recall, that any conditional event in our model is a projection of a
Markov chain, derived from a Moore machine for the underlying conditional
object. Since for every Moore machine there exists the minimal Moore
machine computing the same function, in presence of probabilities, we thus
always have the minimal Markov chain underlying any given conditional
event.
Lemma 26. Let a and b be strongly independent. Then the minimal Markov
chains for a and b are independent.
Proof. Let X and Y be two independent Markov chains, underlying a and
b. Applying the quotient construction to X and Y we pass to the minimal
Markov chains underlying a and b. The quotient construction is determinis-
tic, and therefore it does not break independence (exactly like strong inde-
pendence implies independence). It follows that the minimal Markov chains
are independent, too.
Proof of Theorem 23. The conditional events a and b are strongly indepen-
dent iff the minimal Markov chains underlying them are independent, by
Lemma 26. The latter can be expressed equivalently by (mn + 1)mn con-
ditions of the form (18) for minimal chains of m and n states, respectively,
by Lemma 24. Each of these conditions in turn can be expressed equiva-
lently by a single equality of asymptotic probabilities of certain conditional
objects. This means that the strong independence of a and b can be equiv-
alently characterized by a set of equalities among asymptotic probabilities
of conditionals, which can be syntactically determined from a and b and do
not depend on the probability space structure.
Of course, for conditionals which are themselves Markov chains for any prob-
ability assignment, strong independence is the same as independence. There-
fore we have
Corollary 27. For conditionals which are themselves Markov chains for
any probability assignment, independence can be characterized by equalities
of asymptotic probabilities.
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The conditionals to which this applies can be recognized by the property that
their minimal Moore machine has at most one state labeled by each element
of 3 (and thus at most three states altogether). Present tense conditionals
are of this kind, and thus we have an alternative proof of Theorem 22, which
much less elegant set of equalities, however. But present tense conditionals
do not exhaust all conditionals, which are Markov chains. An example is
the conditional (a|(( ✉a→ a∁) ∧ ( ✉a∁ → a) ∧ (¬ ✉true → a))), analyzed
in [TRH01]. Its minimal Moore machine is depicted below.
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Figure 7: Moore machine of (a|(( ✉a→ a∁)∧( ✉a∁ → a)∧(¬ ✉true → a))).
Therefore Theorem 23 is indeed stronger than Theorem 22.
Finally, we consider the question of PS cea, for which one might want a
characterization of independence in terms of asymptotic probability. Here
we give a negative answer.
Theorem 28. There exist two conditional expressions e1 and e2 and a prob-
ability space such that the embeddings τ(e1) and τ(e2) are independent, while
their sparse reverse counterparts τRS(e) and τRS(e2) are not independent.
Proof. Take e1 = e2 = (0|a) and any probability space with 0 < Pr(a) < 1.
Then [[τ(e1)]] and [[τ(e2)]] are constant processes, equal to 0, so they are
(trivially) independent. However, already
Pr(
[[τRS(e1)]])(w) = 0⊥
[[τRS(e2)]])(w) = 0⊥
) = Pr([[τRS(e1)]])(w) = 0⊥)
> (Pr(([[τRS(e1)]])(w) = 0⊥))
2
= Pr([[τRS(e1)]])(w) = 0⊥) · Pr([[τ
RS(e2)]])(w) = 0⊥),
where the inequality holds because Pr([[τRS(e1)]])(w) = 0⊥) = Pr(a)(1 −
Pr(a)) 6= 0, 1.
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Corollary 29. There is no characterization of independence in PS cea in
terms of equalities of asymptotic probability.
Proof. Because both τ(·) and τRS(·) preserve all asymptotic probabilities of
conditionals, both of them satisfy precisely the same equalities of asymptotic
probabilities. So if there were a characterization of independence in terms
of equalities of such probabilities, the interpretations of the two conditionals
(a|0) and (a|0) above would have to be either independent in both cases, or
dependent in both cases, while they are not, a contradiction.
The consequence is that in the cea formalism is not expressive enough to de-
fine independence of conditionals by means of equalities of asymptotic prob-
abilities. Note however, that such a representation is certainly possible by
means of equalities of probabilities and equalities of the algebraic structure.
Indeed, PS cea is boolean algebra with respect to its connectives ∧,∨,∼
(as it is easily visible from its syntactic representation within (TL|TL)),
and the equalities it satisfies enforce, that Pro is an ordinary probability
measure. Therefore independence is equivalent to the standard equality
Pro(〈〈e1 ∧ e2〉〉PS) = Pro(〈〈e1〉〉PS) Pro(〈〈e2〉〉PS). What we have constructed
are two non-boolean subsystems of (TL|TL), in which all the (asymptotic)
probability assignments agree with those of Pro, and yet no set of equalities
of probabilities can characterize the true probabilistic independence in both
of them simultaneously.
5.3 Algorithms
Polynomial algorithm for PS cea . Let us see that our approach pro-
vides a nontrivial improvements to the algorithmic status of existing cea’s.
We will demonstrate this by calculating the probabilities of conditional ex-
pressions, according to PS cea, in time polynomial in their size and expo-
nential in the number of variables. (Note that the number of arguments for
computation of the probability of an n-ary conditional is 2n, so the above
indeed means computation polynomial in the size of the input.) In [Goo94]
it is stated that the computation of the PS-probability of a conjunction of
n conditionals (ai|bi), according to the method used in that paper, requires
adding
∑n
m=1m! · S0(m,n) · (2
m+1 − 2) terms, each being a nonconditional
probability of a conjunction of certain events ai and bi. The number of sum-
mands, where S0(m,n) are Stirling’s number of the second kind, is of order
2n logn. It is substantially more than about c2n one obtains for the present
tense cea’s SAC and GNW, and has been stressed in [GMN97, p. 499] and in
[Fou], since it strongly affects the usefulness of PS as a tool for applications.
Using our approach we have instantly an algorithm to calculate the same
probability in 2O(n) steps. As a matter of fact, this applies to any condi-
tional expression with n arguments (ai|bi), i = 1 . . . , n, as long as its length
does not exceed 2O(n). All the complexity bounds given here assume unit
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cost of basic arithmetical operations: addition, multiplication, subtraction
and division.
Theorem 30. There is an algorithm, computing the PS probability of an
n-ary conditional expression of length m in time polynomial in max(m, 2n).
Proof. The first step of the algorithm on input expression e is to construct
the minimal Moore machine, computing τ(e).
Lemma 31. The minimal Moore machine of τ(e) for n-ary conditional ex-
pression e has at most 3n states.
Proof. The minimal Moore of first(a|b) has 3 states (see (8) and Figure 2).
By the definition of the τ(·) embedding (Section 4.5), a Moore machine
A = (Q,Ω, δ, h, q0) of τ(e) can be constructed as follows:
The set Q of states of A is the product Q1× · · · ×Qn of state sets of Moore
machines Ai = (Qi,Ω, δi, hi, q0i) of all expressions first(ai|bi) occurring in
τ(e). The transition function of A is defined coordinate-wise, i.e.,
δ(〈q1, . . . , qn〉, ω) = 〈δ1(q1, ω), . . . , δn(qn, ω)〉,
the initial state is q0 = 〈q01, . . . , q0n〉, and, crucially,
h(〈q1, . . . , qn〉) = cˆ(h1(q1), . . . , hn(qn)),
where cˆ(h1(q1), . . . , hn(qn)) is the classical logic evaluation of the expression
c on arguments h1(q1), . . . , hn(qn) ∈ 2.
This product construction is well-known for automata theory, and it is im-
mediate that it does the work.
So it is quite easy to construct, given e ∈ L, the Moore machine of τ(e). Now
we have to turn this Moore machine into a Markov chain. Assuming that
all the probabilities of atomic events from Ω are given, we simply replace
multiple transitions between the same states represented by the sum of their
probabilities—a single number.
Furthermore, the Markov chain we obtain is absorbing, i.e., it has one-
element ergodic classes. It can be proven by a straightforward induction on
n — the number of three element Moore machines we product. It follows
[KS76, Chapter III] that we can use the following method to compute the
limiting probability that the chain finally arrives at a state labeled by 1.
Clearly, in this situation we can collapse all absorbing states labeled 1 into
a single such state.
Denote by P the matrix (p(i, j)) of transition probabilities, by Q the sub-
matrix of rows and columns corresponding to transient states, and by
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the submatrix of rows corresponding to transient states and columns corre-
sponding to absorbing states. Let Id be a diagonal matrix with 1’s on the
diagonal and 0’s elsewhere. Let B = (Id − Q)−1R. Then the probability
we are looking for is the entry in B in the row corresponding to the initial
state in in the column corresponding to the (only) absorbing state labeled
by 1 in the Markov chain. Since all the calculations on matrices necessary
to compute B are doable in time polynomial in the size of the matrices, the
total computation time is (2n)O(1) = 2O(n), as desired.
6 Summary
We have discussed the temporal calculus of conditional objects and condi-
tional events (TL|TL) as a formalism alternative to conditional event alge-
bras.
We have shown that all the major conditional event algebras, including
those of Schay-Adams-Calabrese, Goodman-Nguyen-Walker and the prod-
uct space cea, embed isomorphically in (TL|TL).
Moreover, (TL|TL) is superior to those formalisms in several ways:
• It provides natural, probabilistic semantics of conditionals, allowing
one to construct experiments to evaluate all their interesting proba-
bilistic parameters, unlike cea’s, which generally are not probability
spaces, and which do not require certain probabilistic parameters to
be defined at all.
• The construction of (TL|TL) is functorial, in the sense, that the un-
derlying probabilistic space of nonconditional events determines the
space of temporal conditional events uniquely, while cea’s generally
are not unique.
• The formalism of (TL|TL) allows one to define and analyze indepen-
dence of conditional events, which is difficult or impossible in cea’s.
• (TL|TL) offers better algorithms for calculation of probabilities, than
those known previously for cea’s.
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